Did Mohamed Ali Jinnah divide India?

Jinnah   India – Partition Independence by Jaswant Singh published in 2009 by Rupa & Co

Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life :  Hindus and Muslims in India by Ashutosh Varshney by in 2002 Oxford University Press

The partition of India in 1947 still perturbs the minds of Indians.  After 65 years of independence we still search for answers to questions such as, who was responsible for the division of this  country?  Was it the Congress or the Muslim League?  Was Mohamed Ali Jinnah the greatest single impediment to a united India emerging after colonialism or did a non-accommodative Congress fail to address the fears of the Muslim community of Hindu domination in an independent India?  What was the raison d’être of August 1947 and violence that accompanied it?  The book by Jaswant Singh focuses primarily on Jinnah and his predominant role in this tragedy. 

More than anyone else, it was Jinnah and his personality which shaped the creation and establishment of Pakistan.  Jaswant Singh converges on the primacy of Jinnah to the evolution of the idea of a separate homeland for Muslims – with its attendant ironies one of which being, until recently more Muslims lived in India rather than in Pakistan and the epicentre of Pakistan movement, United Provinces was left in India rather than ceding to the country it created for the Muslims of the sub-continent.  Jaswant Singh at various places in the book unwittingly gives – despite the focus on Jinnah – the reasons for the evolution of the idea of Pakistan.  At times, the reasons given by Singh go somewhat against the primary focus of the book on Jinnah.

The year 1937 was thought to be a watershed that defined the future of Hindu-Muslim relationship.  Jaswant Singh refers to it at four places in a single chapter dealing with 1937.  “Paradoxically the Congress achieved the very reverse of this, all such attitudening gave the Muslim League a new lease of life and set in motion a process that culminated eventually in the partition of India (P.224)”.   “There is no doubt that the decision of the congress leaders was extremely unwise and it was bound to have disastrous consequences.  The Muslims now fully realised that as a separate community they had no political prospects.  The congress ultimatum was the signal for the parting of ways which by evitable stages led to the foundation of Pakistan (P.232)”  “The rupture transformed the organisation and political programme of the Muslim League, it set the Congress on course which eroded the image  and ultimately alienated a bulk of Muslims of U.P.  More tellingly this one single event continued to caste its long shadow over the tone, comment and tenor of India’s political debate  and rhetoric for the next decade and it contributed significantly to an eventual partitioning of the country in 1947 (P234).  “This is how Khaliquzzaman describes the subsequent meeting  which eventually also contributed to the Pakistan resolution in March 1940 (P.253).”

The 1937 election and the failure to form a unitary government was a litmus test on the efficacy of Hindu-Muslim partnership and construction of a structure of power sharing.  Why did this attempt fail?  First of all, there was no pre-election alliance between the congress and Muslim League to form a coalition and therefore the breakdown was of no consequence.  Nehru was against a pact with an elitist Muslim organisation like the League.  Congress, though it did poorly in Muslim seats thought that direct contact with Muslims would do the trick. 

What was the dimension of the problem which beset the congress administration in 1937-39?  Jaswant Singh says, “....apart from deflecting the inevitable accusations of Muslim League, the congress party and government had both to conduct their affairs beyond reproach, to show themselves  as scrupulously even-handedly, totally non-partisan.  This under the then prevailing circumstances of U.P. was near impossible.”   What was the consequence of this inability of congress to admit Muslim league in a coalition and power-sharing agreement?  “This rupture transformed the organisation and political programmes of the Muslim League.  It set the Congress on a course which eroded its image, and ultimately, alienated a bulk of the Muslims of UP.”  Through all these, the Muslim League grew from strength to strength and thus its sole spokesman, Mr. M.A. Jinnah.  As he said at that time, “When I say hundred million Muslims, I mean that 99 per cent of the them are with us leaving aside some who were traitors, cranks, superman and lunatics.” 

Through it all, the Congress now with the Nehruvian stamp firmly fixed, maintained its non-denominational representative character.   As he put it, “We have to deal with all organisations and individuals that come within our ken.  We do not determine the  measure of importance or distinction they possess.” Jinnah was equally acerbic in his reply to Nehru, “Unless the Congress recognise Muslim League on a footing of complete equality and prepared as such to negotiate for Hindu-Muslim settlement, one shall have to wait and depend upon our inherent strength which will determine the measure of importance or distinction we possess”.

In the opinion of the Muslim League, it was this question of a negotiated power-sharing arrangement between Hindus (as represented by the Congress) and the Muslims (as represented by the Muslim League) which was at the heart of the Hindu-Muslim problem.  Muslim League desired a weighted equality between the two communities despite the numerical inequality between Hindus and Muslims and a negotiated share of sovereignty of a future independent India.  Congress refused through various negotiations to bend to Muslim League pressure and it retained its right  to represent all communities in the country. The Muslim League wanted the Congress to give up its right to represent the Muslims.  The Congress also believed that sovereignty was indivisible.  This differing perception of sovereign arrangement was the point of departure which, as Jaswant Singh was fond of saying, ultimately led to the partitioning of the country.

“Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life” is unique in the way it studies the communal problem in independent  India.  Ashutosh Varshney has studied the occurrence of communal riots in three sets of cities, Calicut and Aligarh, Lucknow and Hyderabad and Ahmedabad and Surat.  How is it that one city keeps its composure even at the most trying hours such as 1947 and 1991 while another loses its balance?  How is it that  with similar communal compositions, one city remains calm while another breaks down? Varshney stresses the importance of civil society organisations in bringing the members of different community together and bonding them to maintain communal peace.  More importantly, it is inter community relationships rather intra community bonding which brings them together at times of crisis.  The associational relationships between Hindus and Muslims in businesses, trade and commerce beckons them to nip the communal virus in the bud before it assume giant proportions. Even when Hindus and Muslims vote in elections for their own choice of candidates and generally behave in different ways politically, they do contain the communal virus through their civil society networks.  The author also shows how the potential Hindu-Muslim conflict is submerged in the larger tussles, for example between Shias and Sunnis (in Lucknow) or the liberation of lower castes (in Calicut).  Can civil society relationship be artificially created?  Yes says the author.  He gives the example of Bhiwandi, the textile town near Mumbai, which was notoriously communal and infamous for periodic riots, maintained ethnic peace  because of one Police Officer, who created civil society inter-communal arrangements to maintain peace.  It proved successful even when big brother Mumbai was afflicted with riots in 1991.

Similarly, can consociational ways prevail in societies with a commitment to preserve the ways of life of minorities?  The author gives the example of India where the British gave the Muslims separate electorates to allay their fears about Hindu domination.  This became a source of conflict because the Congress believed that only individuals per se  can express themselves through political parties.   Consociational arrangements have worked in Malaysia but failed in Lebonon.  In the opinion of the author, in order for consociationalism to work, societies must not only be multi ethnic but also highly segregated.  Perhaps the reason why consociationalism has not worked in India is not only because Congress was forcefully against it, but because Muslims could not live segregated lives in India.  Their destiny is inextricably linked with that of Hindus as indeed that of their Hindu counterparts.